aoe:sans401
Table of Contents
Sans 401 June 10-17, 2009
SANS Security Essentials
Schedule
- 0900-1030 - class
- 1030-1050 - break
- 1050-1200/1215 - class
- 1200-1330 - Lunch
- 1330-1500 - class
- 1500-1520 - break
- 1520-1715 - class
- 1715-1900 - Bootcamp
Networking Concepts - Day 1
Module 1: Network Fundamentals..1-2
- color coding scheme
- Red - external
- Yellow - DMZ
- Green - internal
- left interface usually external interface
Network Fundamentals..1-3
types of networks..1-6
- LAN - Local Area Network
- MAN - Metropolitan Area Network
- WAN - Wide area network
- Internet
- PAN - Personal Area Network
Physical and Logical Topologies..1-9
- Physical
- Bus - older
- Ring - older
- Star - most popular
- Logical
- Ethernet
- Token Ring
Ethernet..1-12
- Baseband shared media network.
- CSMA/CD - carrier sense, multiple access with collision detection
- the most common layer 2 protocol
- A Chunk of data transmitted over the wire is called a frame
- Uses 1500 byte frame size
- GigE networks utilize Jumbo Frames. Large numbers of small frames will cause problems on GigE.
Token Ring and FDDI..1-14
- Communications is token based
- Not common with client computing
- Large mainframes where each system needs to communicat in a predictable manner still use this technology
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)..1-17
- Older protocol
- Encapsulates common protocols
- Like combining Ethernet and IP
- expensive to set up, not seen on LANs
- efficient for video streaming
- commonly used for establishing high speed backbones over significant distances
WAN Technologies..1-19
- Dedicated lines
- T1 or T3
- E1 or E3
- Frame Relay
- MPLS - IPv6, VoIP, IP Video – considered a replacement for Frame Relay and ATM
- ISDN - any ISDN could possibly call any other ISDN providing a backdoor attack
- DSL
- Distance limitations
- Cable Modems
- WAN
Networking Hardware..1-24
- Category 1 and 2
- Cat 3 10Mb
- Cat 4 16Mb
- Cat 5,5e 100Mb-1Gb
- Cat 6
- Network Taps
- Vampire Taps
Crossover Cable..1-26
- +TX to +RX
- -TX to -RX
Network Devices..1-28
- Hub
- Bridge
- Switch - can be flooded and turned into a hub. Newer devices not susceptible.
- ettercap
- dsniff
- Router - Drops traffic if it does not know where to send it.
regarding ping
- block-all-icmp cannot (should not) be done on IPv6
- ping
- ECHO REQ →
- ECHO REP ←
- sending an inbound ECHO REP can let a hacker map networks blocking ECHO REQ, because the router sends host unreachable. If the machine exists, the reply will just be dropped, indicating the existence of a machine.
Virtual LAN (VLAN) and Network Access Control (NAC)..1-32
- can be used to switch an attacking machine to a virtual “jail”.
Network Design..1-33
Network Design Objectives..1-34
- Publish separate mail, Web and DNS servers to the Internet
- Provide appropriate access from the internal network to the Internet
- Protect the internal network from external attaccks
- Provide defense-in-depth
- Protect all aspects of the system
Network Sections..1-35
- Public - Internet
- Semi-public(DMZ) - Web, Mail, DNS servers
- Private - Internal Systems
- Locate firewalls:
- Between the Internet and the other networks
- Between the semi-public and private network
- Between sections of varying trust levels
The Final Design..1-38
Module 2: IP Concepts..1-41
Network Protocol..1-44
What is Network Protocol?..1-45
- Three basic purposes
- to standardizw the format of communication
- to specify the order or timing of communication
- to allow all parties to determine the meaning of a communication
- Protocol Stacks - The layered protocols involved in communication
The OSI Protocol Stack..1-47
- International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnect (OSI)
- Application - Layer 7
- Presentation - Layer 6
- Session - Layer 5
- Transport - Layer 4
- Network - Layer 3
- Data - Layer 2
- Physical - Layer 1
OSI vs TCP/IP..1-49
| OSI | TCP/IP |
|---|---|
| 5 Session, 6 Presentation, 7 Application | Application |
| 4 Transport | Transport (TCP) |
| 3 Network | Internet (IP) |
| 1 Physical, 2 Data | Network |
How Protocol Stacks Communicate..1-51
How TCP/IP Packets are Generated..1-52
- Encapsulation passes information to each layer
- Each layer adds header information
- The previous layer's headers are the current layers data
IP Packets..1-55
IPv4 Header..1-56 *
IPv4 Header..1-57
- Version field tells IPv4 or IPv6
- Protocol can be a user defined number by a hacker
- TTL Time to Live, router hops counts
- Decremented each time and is discarded once the count reaches 0
- Can tell how far away in router hops.
- TTL can tell if a packet has been spoofed. If you expect a close route and receive a high count, something is wrong or intercepted (man in the middle).
- Fragment Offset
- 1500 bytes is generally the MTU. Anything longer will need to be put back together once received.
- crafting the offset value can cause bytes to overlap and change the value.
- IP addresses
- Identity Match - commercial SSN finder
IP Header Identifies Protocol..1-60
Network Addressing..1-61
Addressing Basics..1-62
Two Parts of and Address..1-63
- network and Host portions
IPv4 Addressess and Subnets..1-64
- Class A address - 1-127
- N.H.H.H
- 255.0.0.0
- /8
- Class B Address - 128-191
- /16
- Class C Address - 192-223
- N.N.N.H
- 255.255.255.0
- /24
Netmasks and CIDR..1-65
- CIDR provides a shorthand like /16
- 172.20.0.0/16
- the 16 is how many bits are allocated to the network address
Broadcast Addresses
- all 1's for the host portion
- older networking hardware will interpret all zeros as broadcast
- 172.20.15.0/24 broadcast is 172.20.15.255
- Limited Broadcast - 255.255.255.255 limited to local network
- smurf attack based on Windows 95 stack vulnerability from broadcast flood
Private Network Addressing..1-69
- 10.0.0.0
- 172.16.0.0
- 192.168.0.0
- using NAT on wireless does not buy you anything because a sniffer can read the internal IP's
Two Addresses..1-71
- Mac address
- IP address
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)..1-74
- Hacker in the '90's would respond to arp requests and be man in the middle.
Domain Name System (DNS)..1-76
Domain Name System (DNS)..1-77
- Static host tables
Domain Hierarchy..1-79
Types of DNS Queries..1-81
- Gethostbyname
- Gethostbyaddr
DNS Security..1-83
- Attacks
- Cashe poisioning
- Denial of service
- Footprinting - information leakage
- Registration spoofing
- Defenses
- Keep DNS software up-to-date
- Distribute aurhoritative DNS servers
- Limit zone transfers (Never allow this)
- Register with reputable registrars
- split dns
- external
- only authoritative for your domain name
- randomize query id's
- only recursive for your internal dns server
- don't allow zone transfers
- internal
- always does recursion on external
IPv6..1-85
- 128 bits
IPv4 vs. IPv6
- IPv4
- 32 bits, 4.2 billion addresses
- no authentication
- Encryption provided by applications
- Best effort transport
- IPv6
- 128 bits, 240 undecillion addresses
- Provides authentication of endpoinots
- Support for encryption in protocol
- Quality of Service (QoS) features provided in the protocol
IPv6 features..1-88
IPv6 Addressing..1-90
- divided in three portions
- Network prefix (48 bits)
- Subnet ID (32 bits)
- Interface ID (64 bits)
Module 3: IP Concepts II..1-94
Objectives
...OSI
User Datagram Protocol (UDP)..1-98
UDP..1-99
- connectionless communications
UPD uses..1-101
- (Multimedia/VoIP) streaming
- multicasting is required
- transmission is expected to occur on a reliable network.
- TCP is fundamentally incapable of multicasting
- DNS
- Common protocols:
UDP Header..1-103
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol..105
TCP uses..1-107
- Offers flow control to handle network congestion
- Allows for transmission of larger amount of data per packet
- Guaranteed delivery of transmitted dtat is more important than speed
- offers better
FTP (File Transfew Protocol)..1-108 *
- bounce attack can allow access to FTP through firewall
Active vs. Passive FTP..1-111 *
- google “FTP Bounce attack”
Establishing a TCP Connection..1-113
- SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK
TCP Header..1-114
TCP Header - Key Fields..1-116 *
- session hijacking can be accomplished by sending a duplicate frame number which will cause the receiver to discard the old frame
- hunt 1.5 is a tool to hijack telnet or tcp sessions
TCP Code Bits/Flags..1-119 *
- Mask
- SYN 02
- SYN/ACK 12
- ACK 10
Closing a TCP Session..1-121
- an attacker could open a session then disconnect leaving an outbound port open
- graceful close is 4-way
- Abrupt closure RST/ACK in either direction
TCPdump Output from a Graceful Connection Termination..1-123
TCPdump Output from an Aborted Connection
- Because closure occurs based upon a single packet, be sure to validate the packet was not spoofed
- Check Sequence/Acknowledgment numbers
TCP and UDP..1-126
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)..1-127
ICMP..1-128
- two purposes
- report errors
- provide network information
ICMP Header..1-129
- ICMP Payload usually contains the header of the packet that failed
- Payload can contain anything
- tools that cross firewall
- icmptunnel
- httptunnel
- smtptunnel
- loki is an old tool that used the icmp tunnel
ping..1-132
- be most concerned about icmp being used as covert data channel
traceroute..1-133
Unix and Windows Traceroute..1-135
- Unix traceroute uses UDP packets
- Windows tracert uses ICMP
M0dule 4: Protocal Analysis..1-139
Protocal Analysis..1-140
tcpdump/windump..1-143
What is a Sniffer..1-144
- airpcap wireless
- ettercap dcap for wired networks
Sniffing on a Switch..1-147
- The technique of sniffing traffic on a switched segment has been discussed for some time. …dsniff
tcpdump..1-148
tcpdump commands..1-149
- -s entire packet
- -vv
- -nn
Analysys with tcpdump..1-150
Sample TCPdump ICMP Output..1-153
Sample TCPdump UDP Output..1-154
Sample TCPdump TCP Output..1-155
- some extra fields
- Flag
- Sequence numbers
Reading Packets..1-157
Hexadecimal Representaion..1-160
Five Tips for Decoding Packets..1-161
Decoding and IP Header..163 ..1-170
Decoding a TCP Header..1-171 ..1-180 (* 1-177 and 1-180)
Calculating Variable Length Fields..1-177
Module 5: Virtual Machines..1-183
Module 6: Safety and Physical Security
Managing Safety & Physical Security..1-231
- Safety trumps security
- oftcrack
- backtrack
Evacuation Procedures..1-237
Restricted Area..1-253
Preventing Unauthorized access..1-258
Deterring Unauthorized Access..1-262
Managing Physical Security..1-267
Cookbook Tools - Networking Concepts..2-1
Defense in Depth - Day 2
Module 7: Defense in Depth..2-2
Defense in Depth..2-3
router example - put in
- no ip source routing
- no ip directed broadcast
Defense in Depth..2-5
- application flaws should be known to the user for them to make the decision on how to proceed.
- the informed user is a safe user
What is Defense-in-Depth?..2-6
- Data
- Application
- Host
- internal network
- perimeter
- Physical security
Focus of Security is Risk..2-7
- Risk = threat x vulnerabilities
Key Focus of Risk..2-8
Prioritizing CIA..2-10
- Confidentiality
- Pharmaceuticals
- soft drink manufacturers
- Integrity
- Availability
What is a Threat?..2-11
- Primary Threats:
- Malware
- Insider
- Natural disasters
- Terrorism
Vulnerabilities..2-13
- known
- unknown - “zero day”
- unpatched systems
- mis-configured systems
Approaches to DiD..2-15
Uniform Protection..2-16
Protected Enclaves..2-17
Information Centric..2-18
Vector-Oriented..2-19
Viruses and Malicious Code..2-20
Viruses..2-23
COM/Script Program Infectors..2-25
- inserts itself in existing code
EXE Program Infectors..2-26
- similar to com infectors
web bug
- a 1×1 document that points to a remote site which records a log entry indicating the document has been opened.
- cnn.com use techniques like this all the time.
Worms..2-27
- Attack systems through known vulnerabilities
- scan for more systems to attack
- used to build botnets
The Morris Worm 1988..2-29
Linux Worms..2-31
- search for lrk4 lrk5 lrk6 to find these rootkits
SQL Slammer Worm..2-33
Sasser/Netsky Worms..2-34
Conficker Worm..2-35
Fixing the Problem..2-36
What Worms Teach Us about Configuration management..2-37
Malicious Browser Content..2-39
Hybrid Threats..2-41
Malware Capabilities..2-43
- backdoor access
- leaking of data
propagation Techniques..2-46 *
Malware Defense Techniques..2-47 *
- Activity monitoring
- malware scanners
- File and resource integrity checking
- Stripping e-mail attachments - can cause business practice problems
- Remember defense-in-depth
- Patch all systems
- turn off unused services
Malware Analysis..2-54
"The machinery of democracy"
- paper on problems with voting machines
Module 8: Basic Security Policy..2-57
Basic Security Policy..2-58
Why an Organization Needs a Security Policy..2-61
- Protect people who are trying to do the right thing
Convincing the Organization..2-63
- if an organization does not have this is will cost money maybe in fines
Mission Statement..2-64
Overall Security Posture..2-65
Example Posture Issues..2-66
- Presumption of privacy
- physical search
- Trust for all connections initid inside the organization
- no egress filtering
Establish a Documentation Baseline..2-68
Policy and Procedures..2-69
- A high level policy should not address specific technologies
Defining a Policy..2-70
- make sure there is a way to enforce the policy. For instance each user should be responsible for activities from an account.
Procedure Definitions and Issues..2-71
Standard Definitions and Issues..2-72
Baseline Definitions and Issues..2-73
Guideline Definitions and Issues..2-74
Documentation Review..2-75
Issue-Specific Policies..2-76
Policy Table of Contents..2-77
Policy Statement Must..2-79
- SMART
Is the Policy..2-81
- consistent with law, regulations?
Creating the Policy..2-83
Building the Policy: State the Issue..2-84
Example of Applicability/Scope..2-85
Compliance/Penalties..2-86
Non-Disclosure Agreement..2-88
Intellectual Property - Copyright..2-90
Contingency Planning..2-93
What is a Business Continuity Plan?..2-95
What is a Disaster Recovery Plan?..2-97
BCP vs DRP...2-99
Basic Elements of Continuity Planning..2-102
BCP Key Components..2-104
Business Impact Analysis..2-105
- Maximum tolerable downtime MTD
BCP-DRP Planning Process Lifecycle..2-107
Top BCP/DRP Planning Mistakes..2-108
Asset Classification (Randy's)
* several machines may be part of a single system, such as an Oracle system
Module 9: Access Control and Password Management..2-112
Access Control Theory..2-115
Key Terms & Principles..2-116
- it is the data owners job to determine if the data is sensitive.
Data Classification by Sensitive and by Type..2-118
Identity, Authentication, Authorization, and Accountability..2-120
- Identity
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Accountability
- Angels and Demons ←-movie
Controlling Access..2-122
- Least Privilege
- Need to Know
- Separation of Duties
- Rotation of Duties
Access Control Techniques..2-123 *
- Discretionary
- Mandatory
- Role-based
- Ruleset-based
- List-based
- Token-based
Managing Access..2-125
Single Sign-On (SSO)..2-127
Protocols and Centralized Control..2-128
Password Management..2-131
Reversible and Irreversible Encryption..2-132
Access Control: Passwords..2-134
- best stored as irreversible hashes
What is Password Cracking?..2-135
- crack for unix systems used the dictionary to create hashes and compared to the password file
What determines the strength of a Password Hash?..2-137
- Quality of algorithm
- etc…
Methods of Password Assessment..2-139
- Dictionary attack
- Hybrid attack
- Brute force
- Precomputation brute force (Rainbow attack)
John the Ripper vs Linux MD5 Password File..2-143
Windows Passwords..2-146
- ntds.dit
Cain-Password Cracking..2-148
Rainbow Tables..2-151
- ophcrack website has pre-made tables
Winrtgen..2-152
Cain and Rainbow Tables..2-154
How to protect against password Cracking Hacks..2-155
- check the passwords!
Enforce a Strong Password Policy..2-156
Use Shadow Passwords..2-159
Use One-time Passwords..2-160
Utilize Biometrics..2-162
Disable LAN Manager Authentication..2-165
Module 10: Incident handling Foundations..2-168
Incident handling Fundamentals..2-171
Why is it Important?..2-173 *
What is an Incident?..2-175
What is an Event?..2-176
Overview of the Incident-Handling Process..2-179
The Six-Step Process for Incedent Handling..2-180
- Preparation..2-181
- Identification..2-183
- Containment..2-188
- Eradication..2-190
- Recovery..2-192
- Lessons Learned..2-194
Key Mistakes in Incident Handling..2-195
Putting the steps together..2-196
Legal Aspects of Incident Handling..2-198
Incident Handling and the Legal System..2-201
- Criminal Law
- Civil Law
- Others
- GLBA, SOX, HIPAA, PCI
The United States Code, Title 18, Section 1030..2-204
- Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Laws Relating to Incident Handling..2-206
- Computer Security Act of 1987
- US Privacy Act of 1974
- ECPS 1986
- HIPAA
Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection and Espionage..2-208
Search/Seizure with Warrant..2-210
Arrest/False Arrest..2-212
Evidence Must be Admissible..2-213
- base business decisions on logs will show the logs are used for important purposes.
- 18 month retention allows 6 months to do a 1 year log review.
Chain of Custody..2-215
Evidence Integrity..2-217
- md5sum
Real and Direct..2-218
Best Evidence..2-219
- Search Warrant, comply immediately
- supeana contact local authority first
Module 11: Information Warfare..2-221
The Threat, Attacks are Increasing..2-225
More Unknowns than knowns..2-226
Information Warfare tools..2-228
Example of a blended Threat..2-229
Could the US Presidency be Affected?..2-230
Could a city be destroyed?..2-231
Offshore Coding and SW Engineering 2009..2-232
Terrorism and Economic Warfare (The business of terrorism.)..2-233
Information Warfare Theory..2-234
Information Warfare Theory..2-235
Cycle Time..2-237
Indications and Warning..2-238
Indications and Warnings Analysis Model..2-239
Measures of Effectiveness..2-240
Offensive Players..2-241
Offensive Operations Goal..2-242
Increase Value to Offense..2-243
Decrease Value to Defense..2-244
Defense is not Usually Dominant..2-245
Module 12: Web Communications and Security..2-248
Web Application Security..2-251
Web Architecture Hardening..2-255
Web Communication Basics - http..2-257
http transactions..2-259
html-Hypertext Markup Language..2-261 *
html forms..2-262 *
- POST Actions sends form data in http headers
- GET action post form dta appended with URL
Cookies..2-266
SSL/TLS..2-269
Server Side Programming..2-271
Client Side Programming..2-273
Developing Secure Web Applications..2-275
- 99% of problems are input validation problems
- accunetics (commercial), paros (free)
Basics of Secure Coding..2-277
Web Application Service Providers..2-279
Web Application Vulnerabilities..2-281
Web Application Authentication..2-282 *
- basic mode uses base64 encoding
- digest used encryption
Access Control..2-286
Session Tracking/Maintaining State..2-288
Hacking Session Information..2-289
Protection from Session Attacks..2-291
Input Attacks..2-293
Cookbook
Day 3
Module 13: Attack Strategies and Mitigation..3-2
K. Mitnick vs. T. Shimomura..3-6
- Reconnaissance (r utilities, rlogin, rshell)
- TCP/IP sequence number prediction attack
Two Systems, Trust Relationship..3-8
Starting the Attack..3-9
- Finger gives information about users and accounts
Silence B with DoS..3-11
- SYN Floods B
Attacker Probes for a Weakness in A's TCP Stack..3-13 *
- IP spoofing attack
Attacker Pretends to be B..3-14
- The Attacker, pretending to be B, uses the predictable response to open a connection
Make 'A' Defenseless..3-15
- Attacker sends expected ACK wut fake SRC IP Address to establish a connection
Finish the job..3-16
- Sends rshell packet '“echo ++”>/.rhosts' to open the victim to accept any login
- Then, Attacker uses '# rlogin -l root' to takover “A”
Detecting and Prevention Techniques?..3-19
Patch Systems..3-21
Hardening the System Disabling Unused Services..3-22
- disable finger
Network Vulnerability Scanner..3-23
Host-based Intrusion Detection..3-24
- tripwire
- aide
Network-based Intrusion Detection..3-25
Firewalls..3-26
Mitnick Examples: Lessons Learned *
Common Types of Attacks..3-31
Methods of Attack..3-32
- Logic Bombs
- Trojan Horses
- Trap Doors
- Embed malware in something that looks like a music file.
Denial of Service..3-35
- Smurf
- SYN flood
- DDoS Attacks
Physical Attack..3-36
- stealing hard drives
Buffer Overflows..3-37
- poorly coded applications
- extra code placed in buffers can be used to execute attack code
- The Shellcoder's Handbook 2nd or 3rd edition
Buffer Overflow concepts..3-38
- buffer, heap, stack
- “Smashing the Stack” paper on topic
When the Return Address Points to our Payload, We Win!..3-39
Brute Force..3-40
- bombard with passwords
Remote Maintenance..3-42
- vendor can have access to machine
Browsing..3-43
Race Condidtions..3-44
Interrupts..3-46
Alteration of Code..3-47
Rootkits..3-48
- rootkit.com
Module 14: Firewalls and Honeypots..3-51
Why a Firewall?..3-55
- Protecting systems from attempts to exploit vulnerabilities
How does a Firewall fit in the big picture?..3-57
Benefits of Firewalls..3-58
- protects unwanted services
- logs
Shortcomings of Firewalls..3-58
- Attacks at the application layer may sneak through
- Dial-up, VPN extranet can bypass.
The Default Rule..3-60
Filtering..3-61
- firewall protect in one direction only
- Ingress
- Egress
Multi-Zone Designs..3-63
Stateless Packet Filter..3-65
No State Inspection ACK Flag Set..3-66
Stateful Firewalls..3-68
- what happens if the state table fills up
- DoS or Stateless
Stateful Inspection with FTP..3-70 *
Proxy or Application Gateway..3-72
Desktop Protection Personal Firewalls..3-74
Firewall Complementing and IDS..3-75
Network Address Translation (and Private Addresses)..3-76
- wireless allows anyone to sniff addresses behind NAT
Port Address Translation(PAT)..3-78 *
Randy's
- Old document on firewall configuration
http://www.security.vt.edu/lockitdown/Firewall_Ports_and_Protocols_Summary.doc
- 80, 1494 are only needed now for Citrix server
Honeypots..3-81
What is a Honeypot?..3-82
- system that has no legitimate purpose for someone to connect.
Honeypot Example..3-84
Advantages of Honeypots..3-84
- Provides insight
Disadvanges of Honeypots..3-86
- Way too time consuming
Classifying honeypots..3-90
Basic honeypot - Netcat Listener..3-93
- nc -l -p 80 -n -o hexcapture.txt >port80-listener.txt
honeyd..3-94
- simulate network
Sticky Honeypots - LaBrea Tarpit..3-99
Deploying Honeypots..3-102
Honeypot Checklist/Summary..3-104
Module 15: Vulnerability Scanning..3-107
R3: Reconnaissance, Resource Protection, ROI..
- Steve Gibbson - Shields up
5 Vulnerability axioms..3-113
Threat Types and Vectors..3-114
Threat Concerns..3-115
Firewall Subversion..3-117
KaZaA - Firewall Subversion..3-118
- P2P
- bounce a scan off an internal machine
Bypassing Firewall Protection..3-120
Firewalls, Wireless Connections, and Modems..3-121
HTTP Tunnels..3-123
Social Engineering..3-125
Social Engineering Defense..3-127
Bypassing Firewall Protection Controls..3-128
Network Mapping Tools..3-129
Network Mapping Tools..3-129
- ids.cirt.vt.edu
Finding Unprotected Shares - Legion..3-131
Hping3 - Spoofing Port Scanner..3-133
- allows crafting packets with illegal flag settings
Attack History..3-136
Network Scanning..3-139
What is a Port Scan?..3-140
Port Scanning with Nmap..3-142
- nmap -A -T4 testip
Simple nmap scan..3-144
nmap scan types..3-146
Operating System Identification..3-149
- system fingerprinting based on responses to various requests
Vulnerability Scanning..3-151
Vulnerability Scanners..3-152
- only scan systems you own
- the difference between a hacker and a vulnerability scan is permission
How to do a Vulnerability Scan..3-154
- scan when you can respond
Nessus..3-156
- Freeware scanner.
- grand daddy of all scanners
Alternate Network Mapping Techniques..3-167
Wireless network scanning..3-168
Net Stumbler..3-169
- Windows
Kismet..3-172
- Linux
Mitigating Wireless network Mapping..3-176
War Dialing..3-177
- identify phone modems and see who answers to find an entry point
War Dialers..3-178
Managing Penetration testing..3-181
- Core Impact
- metasploit auto pwn
Pen Testing Techniques..3-182
Scanning Tools Warning..3-184
Module 16: Intrusion Detection Technologies..3-189
Intrusion Detection Technologies..3-189
What is IDS?..3-192
- sec 503 Sans intrusion detection
IDS Technology..3-194
IDS Alerts..3-197
- true positives, False Positive
- True Negative, False Negative
NIDS Overview..3-199
- passive sensor, a sniffer
How Signature Analysis Works..3-201
- to attack a signature, alter the signature
Rules and Signature Criteria..3-202 *
How Anomaly Analysis Works..3-204 *
- requires an understanding of what “normal” is
How Application Protocol Analysis Works..3-205
- things like it's not possible to have SYN and FIN set at the same time
Deep vs. Shallow Packet Inspection..3-207
Data Normalization..3-209
NIDS Advantages..3-210
NIDS Challenges..3-213
Topology Limitatinos..3-214
Analyzing Encrypted Traffic..3-216
Signature Quality vs Quantity..3-217
Performance Limitations..3-218
NIDS Costs..3-220
TCPdump as NIDS..3-222
Snort as NIDS..3-224
Snort Rule Flexibility..3-227
Writing Snort Rules..3-228
Simple Snort Rules..3-229
Advanced Snort Rules..3-230
Key Points for NIDS..3-231 *
Developments in NIDS..3-233
HR IDS Application - Content Monitoring Systems..3-236
HIDS Overview..3-238
- Early were local only with no way to collect logs.
How File Integrity Checking Works..3-241
- Tripwire
How Log Monitoring works..3-242
- logcheck
HIDS Network Monitoring..3-244
HIDS Advantages..3-245
HIDS Challenges..3-246
HIDS Recommendations..3-248
Developments in HIDS..3-248
- Zone Alarm is Randy's Favorite
Host and Network-based Intrusion Detection..3-251
Internet Storm Center..3-252
Module 17: Intrusion Prevention Technologies..3-255
What is IPS?..3-259
What IPS is Not?..3-261
HIPS Detail..3-263
- Host based Intrusion Prevention System
HIPS Advantages..3-264
HIPS Challenges..3-265
Application Behavior Monitoring..3-267
HIPS Recommendations..3-269
- to test, use hping
- Port Sentry
Developments in HIPS..3-271
NIPS Overview..3-273
How NIPS Work..3-274
NIPS Detail..3-275
NIPS Challenges..3-278
Passive Analysis..3-279
Developments in NIPS..3-281 *
IPS Examples..3-284
Randy
- network-tools.com/analyze
- FastDial add on for Firefox
Module 18: IT Risk Management..3-291
Risk management Overview..3-295
IT Risk management - Where do I Start?..3-296
IT is Only One Form of Risk..3-300
Define Risk..3-301
Risk Management Questions..3-302
SLE vs ALE..3-305
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE - one shot)..3-306
Annualize Loss Expectancy (ALE - multi-hits)..3-307
Quantitative vs Qualitative..3-309
Threat Assessment, Analysis & Report to Management..3-311
Business Case for Risk Management..3-312
Business Case - Applications..3-313
Step 1 Threat Assessment and Analysis..3-314
Outsider Attack - Internet..3-316
Insider Attack - Internal Net..3-318
Insider Attack - Honeypot..3-320
Malicious Code..3-321
Step 2 - Asset Identification and Valuation..3-322
Step 3 - Vulnerability Analysis..3-323
Step 4 - Risk Evaluation..3-324
Step 5 - Interim Report..3-325
Acceptable Risk - Who Decides?..3-326
Cost Benefit Analysis..3-327
"Final" Report..3-328
Cookbook - Internet Security Technologies..2-1
Available upon request from Security Office ***
- Nexpose commercial vulnerability scanner
- Hawki asset manager
find where ipaddresses originate
- ip2location.com
- dnsstuff.com
Day 4
Module 19: Encryption 101..4-2
Encryption 101..4-3
What is Cryptography?..4-6 **
- means hidden writing
- plaintext is a message in its original form
- Ciphertext is a message in its encrypted form
- David kann, “Codebreaker”
Security by Obscurity is no Security..4-8
- never believe in a secret pro proprietary cryptographic algorithm
Beware of Overconfidence..4-10
- large key lengths do not ensure security
Credit Cards Over the Internet..4-11
The Challenges That We Face..4-13
Goals of Cryptography..4-14 *
Digital Substitution (Encryption)..4-16
Digital Substitution (Decryption)..4-18
- symmetric crypto system uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt
General Symetric Encryption Technique..4-19
- substitution
- Permutation
- Hybrid
Arbitrary Substitution..4-20
Rotation Substitution..4-21
- Usenet uses ROT-13
Permutation..4-23
Block Ciphers..4-24 *
- ECB
- CBC
- CFB
- OFB
Stream Ciphers..4-26 *
- could be used for VoIP
General Types of Cryptosystems..4-28
Types..4-29
- Secret Key
- Symmetric
- Single or 1-key encryption
- Public Key
- Asymetric
- Dual or Two key encryption
- Hash
- One-way transformation
- No key encryption
Symetric Key Cryptosystems..4-30
- AKA “Secret Key” Encryption
- DES
- Triple-DES
- RC4
- IDEA
Asymmetric Key Cryptosystems..4-32
- “Public-Key” Encryption
- RSA
- EI Gamal
- ECC
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange..4-35 *
- Agree on a large prime number, n
- generator number, g
- …
- algorithms like this are not unbreakable, just not in a reasonable amount of time
Hash Functions..4-37
- No Key
- Primary Use: Message integrity
- “weaknesses in oracle password algorithm”
- a weakness involves multiple strings resolving to the same hash.
- marchany, marchan, marcha all could give the same hash. This is bad
Steganography..4-39
Steganography (Stego)..4-40
- hides message in another, like a message in a picture
Crypto vs Stego..4-41
Detecting Cryptography..4-43
Historgrams..4-44
How Steganography Works..4-45
- need Host to carry the message, an image or sound file
General Types of Stego..4-46
- Injection..4-47
- antiword - retrieves deleted text in a Word document
- hydan
- Substitution..4-49
- Generate New File..4-46
- spammimic.com
- xrite.com Online color Challenge
Module 20: Encryption 102..4-53
Concepts in Cyptography..4-57
- Tractable problems
- Intractable problems, cannot be solved in a reasonable time..4-58
- factory primes
- solving the discrete logarithm problem (El Garmal)..4-61
- Computing Elliptic curves (ECC)..4-63
- low power consumption would be useful on cell phones, pda's
Symmetric & Asymmetric Cryptosystems..4-64
DES..4-65
- began in 1975 (same time Randy started at Tech)
- O'Riely “Cracking DES”
DES Weakness..4-66
DES Advangage..4-68
Meet-in-the-middle Attack..4-69 *
Triple DES..4-70
AES..4-72
- Advanced Encryption Standard
- round is the number of iterations within the algorithm
AES Algorithm..4-74 *
AES Basic Functions..4-75
AES (2)..4-76
- DVD encryption secrecy resulted in a crackable system
- seed numbers make an algorithm secure
RSA..4-77
- center part of SSL
- cracked system have been insecure keys or small key length
AES vs. DES (Asymetric vs Symmetric)..4-78
- speed. DES is about 100 times faster
Elliptic Curve Cyptosystems (1)..4-79
- PDA's smart phones, appliances, smart cards
Elliptic Curve Cyptosystems (2)..4-80
Comparing Key Length..4-82 *
- important when evaluating vendor encryption
- bigger may not be better
- compare sysmetric systems with symetric systems
Crypto Attacks..4-83
- known plaintext attack
- chosen plaintext attack
- Adaptive chosen plaintext attack
- Ciphertext only Attack
- Chosen ciphertext attack
- Chosen key attack
Birthday Attack..4-87
- pairs of messages might share the same hash
Module 21: Applying Cryptography..4-90
Applying Cryptography..4-91
Objectives..4-92
- Data in Transit - VPN's
- data at rest - PGP
- Key Management - PKI
Virtual Private Networks (VPN's)..4-95
Confidentiality in Transit..4-96
- private network
Virtual Private Network (VPN)..4-97
- data encrypted at on end, cyphertext is transmitted
- endpoints are the weakness
VPN Advantage - "Flexibility"..4-98
VPN Advantage - "Cost"..4-99
VPN Breakdown..4-100
Types of Remote Access..4-101
Security Implications..4-103
- must trust the other end
IPSec Overview..4-105
- IP Security Standard for VPN's
- the term gets blurred with a Windows term
Types of IPSec Headers..4-106 *
- authentication header (AH)
- ICV computation , AH includes every field that does not change from source to destination
- Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP)
- encrypts the entire message including the header
Types of IPSec Modes..4-109 *
- tunnel mode (site to site VPN's)
- entire ip packet
- transport mode (client side)
SSL VPN's..4-112
- requirements for procurement..4-113 *
Examples of Non-IPSec VPN's..4-114
- ssh
- L2TP
- SLIP
- PPP
- SOCKS
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)..4-116
Confidentiality in Storage..4-117
- Phil Zimmerman
- entire disk vs file-by-file
On-the-Fly Encryption..4-120
- data encrypted to be transmitted
Establishing a Key..4-121
Choosing a Passphrase..4-122
Encrypting Outbound Email..4-123
Sample PGP-Encrypted E-mail..4-125
Decrypting Inbound E-mail..4-126
Signing Outbound E-mail..4-127
Confirming a Signed E-mail..4-128
Public Key infrastructure (PKI)..4-129
What is the business Value of a Public Key Infrastructure?..4-130
How PKI Works..4-132
- repository of digital certificates that is vetted by some personal identification.
- root CA
- Intermediate CA
- Issuing CA
- implementation
- Microsoft Certificate Services
- Entrust Authority
- Verizon / Cybertrust UniCert PKI
- OpenSSL
Operational Goals of PKI..4-135 *
Digital Certificates..4-139 *
Secure Web Traffic (SSL)..4-141
PKI SSL Crypto: An Illustration..4-143 *
- Client Web Request
- Server Responds
- Client validates certificate & Crypto ( this is the step the client can cause failure by accepting the cert)
- Client encrypts the session dey
- Session key exchange
- Server decrypts the session key
- Encrypted messages are exchanged
Secure E-mail (S/MIME)..4-145
Partial or Whole Disk encryption..4-147
- Microsoft BitLocker..4-148
Other Uses of PKI..4-150
PGP as 'Web of Trust'..4-151
Problems with PKI..4-154
- Certificate Authorities
- expense
- certification of the CA
Applying Cryptography: Summary..4-156
Module 22: Wireless Network Security..4-158
Wireless Network Security..4-159
- PDA's
- Mobile Phones
- Laptops
- Pagers
- HVAC Control Units
- traffic signals
- power meters
Wireless Advantages..4-163
Vertical Markets..4-165
- Healthcare
- Financial
- Academia
- Factroies/Industrial
- Retail
- Wireless Internet Service Providers
Bluetooth..4-168
Bluetooth..4-169
Bluetooth Specification..4-170
Bluetooth Security..4-172
- 4-16 byte pin
- default 0000 or 9999
Bluetooth Security Issues
- hackfromacave.com - John Paul's security tools
blueScanner..4-176
- hcitool bluez-hcidump
- merlin and frontline are commercial sniffers
Bluesnarf Attacks..4-177
Bluetooth Sniffing Impact..4-178
Protecting Bluetooth..4-180
- non-advertise mode
- change pin
- Josh Write utube - Eavesdropping on Bluetooth headsets
- carwhisperer
- bluesnipper
- gumstick computer
ZigBee Wireless..4-182
- HVAC
- product tracking
- medical device monitoring
- Industrial sensors
- Home automation
ZigBee Specification..4-183
- 10-75 meters
- 868 MHz, 915 MHz, 2.4 GHz
- low power consumption, goal of 10 year service
ZigBee Security..4-185
802.11..4-187
IEE 802.11 Wireless..4-188
WEP Security..4-190
- airsnort has been replaced by aircrack (aircrack-ng)
IEEE 802.11i, 802.1x, EAP..4-192
802.1x Authentication..4-193 *
Wi-Fi Protected Access..4-195
Wireless Security..4-196
- wellenreiter - listens for mac address and spoofs the address for wireless access
General Misconceptions..4-197
Top 4 Security Risks for WLAN's..4-203
Eavesdropping..4-204
Eavesdropping Mitigation..4-205
- use strong encryption in the lowest layer protocol possible
- Design you wireless networks with caution- minimize coverage area
- Audit with a sniffer
Masquerading..4-207
Masquerading Mitigation..4-209
- Use SSL/TLS
- Educate users on the danger of clicking “Yes” to digital certificate warnings ←-Joke?
Denial-of-Service Attacks..4-210
DoS Attack Mitigation..4-212
Rogue AP's..4-213
Rogue AP Mitigation..4-214
Steps to Planning a Secure WLAN..4-216 *
- detection tools:
- kismet
- get_essid
Protecting Wireless Networks..4-218 *
Module 23: Voice over IP..4-220
VoIP..4-221
VoIP Functionality & Architecture..4-223
VoIP Overview..4-224
- Phone can be routed and transmitted over the network.
- can be any combination of analog telephone adapter, IP telephone and Computers.
VoIP Risks..4-225
- External attacks
- Internal Misuse
- Theft
- System Malfunction
- Service interruption
LAN VoIP..4-227
WAN VoIP..4-228
VoIP Networking..4-229
Advantages of VoIP..4-231
Disadvantages of VoIP..4-234
VoIP Architecture..4-238
VoIP Components..4-240
- Media Gateways
- Registration and location servers
- Messaging servers
- End user devices: VoIP phones, softphones
VoIP Traffic Patterns..4-242
VoIP Protocols..4-243
- H.323, SIP
VoIP Signaling H.323..4-245 *
- …
- H239
VoIP Signaling - SIP..4-247
- alternate to H.323
SIP Packet Details..4-248
SIP Exchange..4-249
VoIP Media - RTP..4-251
VoIP and TCP vs UDP..4-252
- base protocol decision on need. reliable connection would require TCP
Skype..4-253
VoIP Challenges..4-254
VoIP Operation Challenges..4-255
VoIP Security Challenges..4-257
- CID spoofing. privacy attacks
- Phone impersonation
VoIP Security Challenges..4-259
- Call Hijacking
Securing VoIP..4-261
- security focus article#1862 http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1862
other services
- google voice
Module 24: Operations Security..4-264
Operations Security (OPSEC) Defensive and Offensive Methods..4-265
Management Application - Operations Security (OPSEC)..4-268
The three Laws of Defensive OPSEC..4-270
OPSEC Weekly Assessment Cycle..4-271
Employee Issues..4-273
Employment Agreements..4-275
Need to Know..4-277
Putting it all together..4-278
Sensitive Information..4-280
Offensive OPSEC..4-282
- bing bird's eye view
- pipl.com
- governmentrecords.com
- magtech software for reading and writing magnetic cards
Society for Competitive Intelligence Professionals Code of Ethics..4-290
Corporate Information..4-292
Edgar Search..4-293
Wayback Search..4-298
Company Information from Other Web Sites..4-301
Company Financials..4-302
Project/Product Information..4-304
Individual Information..4-305
Project/Product Information..4-304
Individual Information..4-305
- Intelius
- County Court House records
What does this mean to me..4-306
How to Apply OPSEC - Summary..4-307
- google searches
Cookbook Tools - Secure Communications
pgp
netstumbler
s-tools
- steganographic tools
- bmp
- gif
- wav
Invisible Secrets
- hide information inside
- jpeg
- png
- bmp
- html
- wav
- DOD-compliant shredder
- 30 day demo
- added features cost extra
xsteg/stegdetect
- xsteg is gui front end for stegdetect
- detects stego from the following:
- jsteg
- outguess
- jphide
- invisible secrets
- f5
wireshark
wireshark and VoIP
Day 5
- tiddlywiki java script and css http://www.tiddlywiki.com
- articles to google:
- How Mitnick Hacked Tsutomu Shimomura with an IP sequence attack
- Best Practices for “Forgotten Passwords” Feature
- truecrypt
- only one person gets rw access, all others ro
- put hidden volume inside a visible truecrypt volume (plausible denyability)
- pgp netshare gets around the rw limitation of truecrypt
Module: 25 The Windows Security Infrastructure..5-2
The Windows Security Infrastructure..5-3
Windows Operating Systems..5-5
- Windows Mobile
- not socket access, so no sniffers available
Windows XP..5-6
- xp home used to ship with a blank admin password
- sp2 started shipping with security features enabled
Windows Server 2003..5-9
Windows Vista & Windows 7..5-11
Windows Server 2008..5-14
- same code base as vista
- Powershell
- Hyper-V
Windows Mobile..5-17
- no raw socket support, so no sniffer cannot be written for it
- therefore, no IDS would be available
- showing up in embedded systems
- Windows Mobile security Best Practices..19 *
Windows Workgroups and Accounts..5-21
Workgroups..5-22
- no domain controller
Workgroups..5-24 Benefits
Workgroups..5-25 Drawbacks
- Users are creatively careless
Managing Local Accounts..5-26
- wmic
- netsh
Security ID Numbers (SIDs)..5-27
- SIDs for common accounts are well known, like Administrator and Everyone
- changing the name of these common accounts is a minimal security gain
- it might lessen the brute force attacks
- it could also lessen the log entries
Your Security Access Token (SAT)..5-29
whoami.exe /all /fo list
To Form a More Perfect Workgroup..5-31
Windows Active Directory and Group Policy..5-33
Active Directory Domains..5-34
- master database for machines and users
- similar to nis+
- partial list of what can be stored in Active Directory..5-36 *
Authentication Protocols (1 of 3)..5-37
- 4 parts of SAT..5-37 *
Authentication Protocols: Kerberos (2 of 2)..5-39
- default authentication protocol
- NTLM only used when necessary
- ticket encrypted based on the user's passphrase
- vulnerable to brute-force cracking, last paragraph..40 *
Forests and Trusts..5-42
- ..43 2nd paragraph http://www.microsoft.com/activedirectory
The Nature of Trust..5-44
Cross-Forest Trusts..5-46 *
Group Policy..5-48
How Group Policy Works..5-49
- GPO's applied at boot-up, Logon and 90-120 minute intervals
Module 26: Service packs, Hotfixes and Backups..5-53
Service Packs..5-56
- It's a Giant Patch
- Do staged roll-outs and check for problems
Slipstreaming..5-58
- nlite helps with this
Hands-Free Service Packs..5-59
Hotfixes..5-61
E-mail/Newsfeed Bulletins..5-62
- microsoft.com/security
Installing Multiple Hotfixes..5-63
Organize Hotfixes..5-64
BATCH.BAT..5-65
Microsoft Update..5-67
Windows Update..5-68
Windows Server update Services (WSUS)..5-69
How does WSUS work..5-71
WSUS Administration..5-72 *
3rd-Party Patch Management..5-74
- for remote offices heise or disconnected remote site
http://www.h-online.com/security/Do-it-yourself-Service-Pack--/features/80682
Windows Backup and Restore..5-76
Importance of Backups for Security..5-77
Windows XP/2003 Backup..5-78 *
- ntbackup.exe came from veritas
System State Backup..5-80
- Windows 7 will allow system state over the network
Windows Vista/2008/7 Backup..5-81
- robocopy (Vista/2008/7)
- wbadmin (2008)
Third-Party Backup Solutions..5-84
Binary Disk Images..5-85
System Restore..5-86 *
- system restore snapshot times
Previous Versions..5-89
Device Driver Rollback..5-91
Summary..5-92
comment
To clean up a new system
Module 27: Windows Access Controls..5-94
Windows Access Controls..5-96
NTFS Overview..5-98 *
NTFS DACL's..5-100
Advanced Security Settings for ACE's *
- by default, deny overrides allow
- inherited..5-103 *
NTFS Owners..5-104
Principle of Least Privilege..5-106
- needs analysis
AGULP..5-108,5-109 *
AD Users and Computers..5-110
Shared Folder Permissions..5-112
- net help share
Hidden and Administrative Shares..5-115
Combining NTFS and Share DACL's..5-117 *
- calculate effective permissions of user
What is the Registry?..5-119
Remote Registry Service..5-120
- default is enabled
Registry DACL..5-122
Active Directory Permissions..5-123
Delegation of Authority in AD..5-125
Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)..5-127 *
- medium is default
User Rights..5-129
- ..5-130,5-132 *
Encypting File System..5-137
- can prevent Linux boot disk access
- cipher.exe
EFS Implementation Details..5-139 *
EFS Key Recovery..5-140
EFS Best Practices..5-142
BitLocker Overview..5-144
Trusted Platform Module..5-146
- motherboard failure would render data inaccessible.
BitLocker TPM Options..5-148
Disabling vs Turning Off..5-150
- …the decryption key is stored in plaintext on the drive
Emergency Recovery..5-151,5-153 *
Module 28: Enforcing Security Policy..5-156
Security Templates..5-159 *
- keep track of the template directory with tripwire.
- CIS scoring tool..5-162,5-163
SCA Snap-In..5-164
- there is no Un-Do
SECEDIT.EXE..5-166
Local Group Policy Object..5-167
GPO Security Settings..5-169
GPO Scripts..5-170
- activestate.com
- loopback policy processing mode
Administrative Templates..5-171
- if there is a conflict between user and computer, usually the computer wins
Domain Group Policy Objects..5-173
- gpupdate /force /sync
Default Domain and OU GPO's..5-175
Checklist of GPO Settings..5-176 * (for audit)
GPO > Passphrase Policy..5-177
GPO > Lockout Policy..5-179
GPO > Security Options..5-180,5-183
Anonymous Access..5-184 ** check
net.exe use \\address\IPC$ "" /user:"" * null users not used as much on later OS's
Kerberos & NTLMv1..5-186
- Don't use!
Kerberos & NTLMv2..5-187
The Guest Account..5-188
Administrative Accounts..5-190
- Randy does not recommend 4 or 6 on the slide
Software restriction Policies..5-192
- Windows 7, AppLocker
User Account Control..5-195
Internet Explorer Security..5-198 *
- folders with Low MIC label assigned “low” contain low in name
Internet Explorer Security..5-201
- Internet Zone
- Trusted Sites Zone..5-203
- SmartScreen filter and XSS Filter
Module 29: Windows Network Services..5-207
The Best Way to Secure a Service..5-210
How to disable Service..5-211
- Service Applet
- Security Template
- GPO
- SC.EXE
Security Configuration Wizard..5-214
- Windows XP services that can be disabled http://www.digitalmediaminute.com/article/1841/windows-xp-services-that-can-be-disabled
- blackviper http://www.blackviper.com/
Server Manager..5-218
Network Adapter Bindings..5-220
Do I Still Need NetBIOS?..5-222
- restrict to campus or subnet
- don't let requests off campus or subnet
nbstat.exe -A ipaddress
- refer to table on page 5-223 *
Key Protocols..5-226
- SMB TCP/139/445
- RPC TCP/135
- LDAP TCP/389/636/3268/3269
- Kerberos TCP/UDP/88
More Key Protocols..5-228
The Windows Firewall in Vista/2008/7..5-230
Network Location Types..5-232 *
Managing Firewall Rules..5-234
- Order Firewall Rules are processes..5-235,5-236 *
Windows IPSec & other VPN's..5-238
Internet Protocol Security..5-239
Command-Line IPSec Tools..5-240
IPSec & Group Policy..5-242
Group Policy Example..5-243
Virtual Private Networking..5-245
- never use PPTPv1 or NTML
- these could be required by embedded devices that cannot be updated
- Windows VPN Client..5-247
Routing and Remote Access Service..5-249
Windows IIS Security..5-251
Securing Internet Information Server (IIS)..5-252
Use a Minimal Patched Install..5-253
- the gui is almost required to get it to do anything
Separate NTFS Volumes for Web Content..5-255
- very important
- makes backup easier
Require a Host Header..5-257
Remove Unused Handler Mapping..5-259
Folders Not to Have..5-261
IIS Access Controls..5-263
Some Questions for Your Web Developers..5-267,5-270 *
SQL SErver Security Tips..5-271,5-272 *
- Validate and sanitize all user input before letting it touch the server
Remote Desktop Services..5-273
Remote Desktop Services..5-274
- TCP port 3389
RDP Best Practices..5-278
- Investigate Citrix as a cross-platform alternative
Module 30: Automation, auditing and response..5-285
Windows Automation and Auditing..5-286
Automation..5-289
The Support Tools..5-290,5-291
Microsoft Resource Kits..5-292
WMIC.EXE..5-297
wmic.exe process list full
Network Configuration Tools..5-302
- netsh.exe
Other free Toolsets..5-304
- whatsrunning http://www.whatsrunning.net/
- activeports
Scripting Support And *NIX tools..5-306
Microsoft PowerShell..5-310
- windowsitpro.com has tutorials
Push Scripts with Group Policy..5-312
Scheduling Jobs..5-314
Auditing..5-316 *
Verifying Policy Comliance..5-317
The SCA Snap-In Again..
SECEDIT.EXE..5-320
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer..5-322,5-323 *
MBSACLI.EXE..5-326
Windows Defender..5-328
Creating Snapshots..5-330
Snapshot Batch Script..5-334,5-335,to 5-338
Gathering Ongoing Data..5-339
- event log scanning tools
- Microsoft log parser http://www.microsoft.com/technet/scriptcenter/tools/logparser/default.mspx
Security Event Log and Audit Policies..5-341 *
NTFS, Registry and Printer SACLs..5-343
What Objects Should be Audited?..5-346 *
- running security tools and monitoring logs will help reveal what the logs will look like with a certain attack. Signature.
Log Size and Wrapping Options
- kb183097
Log Consolidation..5-350
IIS Logging..5-352
Change Detection and Analysis..5-355
Cookbook - Windows Security..5-358
nmap scans
nmap SYN: -sS, UDP: -sU, Xmas: -sX, FIN: -sF
Cookbook
SCA
BSA
CIS
Linux Security - Day 6
Module 31: Securing Linux/Unix..6-3
fog
- Free Opensource Ghost http://www.fogproject.org
- http://www.hfslip.org for slipstreaming xp, 2003
- nLite, vLite
Securing Linux/Unix..6-3
Operating System Overview..6-5
Kernel..6-6
- the most important thing to protect from a security point
File system Structure..6-7
- the root structure is independent of drives
File System Strucure..6-8
- only one root denoted by /
Shell..6-9
- three basic shells
- sh was native shell
Examples of Shells..6-10
- sh
- csh
- bash
- ksh
- tcsh
- for windows, COMMAND.COM
Commands You Need to Know..6-11,6-12 *
- pwd..6-13
- cd..6-14
- ls..6-15
- touch / clear..6-16
- cat..6-17
- mv..6-18
- cp..6-19
- mkdir..6-20
- rmdir..6-21
- rm..6-22
- su..6-23
- find..6-26
- grep..6-27
- generic regular expression program
- man
- vms moved from DEC to windows NT (vms→wnt one letter off) (ibm→hal one letter of Arthur C. Clarke's Space Odyssey saga)
Unix File Permissions..6-29
- ls -l
- - regular file
- d directory
- l link
- c
- v
- w implies delete
- x execute, or list directory
Unix File Permissions..6-31 *
- permissions have different meaning if the target it is a file or or a folder
- chmod..6-32
- setuid..6-33
- run program with owner's permission
- for example passwd modifies /etc/passwd, which is not writable by users.
- don't have shell scripts with suid set, especially if the owner is root. Aborting the shell will leave the system in root shell.
- 4 suid, 2 sgid, 1 sticky
- capital S means x is not set
- chmod..38 chmod nnnn <filename>
- chown/chgrp
Group Management..6-40
- newgrp
- groupadd
- groupdel
/etc/group..6-41
- gpasswd..6-42
- id..6-44
uid=500(steve) gid=500(steve) groups=500(steve) context=user_u:system_r:unconfined_t
passwd File "good old days"..6-45
- Hash string stored in passwd file
- @Large book on password cracking
Passwd/shadow..6-46
- AIX
- /etc/passwd
- /etc/security/passwd
- Free BSD
- /etc/passwd
- /etc/master.passwd
- HP-UX
- /etc/passwd
- /etc/files/auth/root
- LINUX(RedHat) & Solaris
- /etc/passwd
- /etc/shadow
passwd File..6-47 *
shadow File..6-48 *
useradd..6-49
- some flavors - adduser
Enabling Password Aging..6-50
- /etc/login.defs
- /etc/default/useradd
Account Password Info..6-52
chage -l <user>
Enforce stronger Passwords..6-53
Restricting Use of Previous Passwords..6-54
Locking User Accounts After To Many Login Failures..6-55
Process Status (ps)..6-56
ps -aux |more
Process Status (ps)..6-57
- User
- PID
- %CPU
- %mem
- vsz
- stat
- start
- time
- command
netstat..6-59
Backup with dd..6-61
Module 32: Securing Linux/Unix..6-63
How Unix Systems Boot..6-65
- 1st stage is MBR
- 2nd stage
Boot Loader..6-69
- lilo
- grub
Run Levels..6-70,6-71 *
inittab..6-72
Run condition directory..6-73
- rc files and directories
- scripts in /etc/init.d
- rc directories have links to these scripts
init.d..6-74
- solaris 10 uses smf instead of rc
service management..6-75
Patch a Disabled Service?..6-76
service command..6-77
chkconfig..6-78
- list services at each run level
How are services started..6-79
- at boot time
- automatically by inetd/xinetd
- cron
- command line
Common Services..6-80
- File sharing - NFS and samba
- Naming - NIS/NIS+, DNS
- RPC
- internet
Network File System..6-81
- UDP port 2049
NFS..6-82.6-83
- different machines can have different users with the same UID
Samba..6-84
- uses smb to share with Windows clients
DNS Basic..6-85
- DNS server check cache first the goes out to root servers
Network Information Service (NIS)..6-86
- used to be called Yellow Pages (yp)
Remote Procedure Call..6-88
Remote Procedure Call in action..6-89
Port Mapper..6-90
Other RPC Services..6-91
- lockd
- statd
- automountd
- rsh
- rcmd and rexd
Inetd/ xinetd..6-92
inetd..6-93
xinetd..6-95
xinetd Key files/Directory..6-96 *
tcpwrappers..6-98
- gave a method for access control for services started with inetd
Module 33: Securing Linux/Unix..6-106
Logs and Log Management
- showing use of log files for business decisions will validate confidence in logs even for legal matters.
Important Log Files..6-108
WTMP Log..6-109
- /var/log/wtmp
- logins and logouts
- last command pulls from here
UTMP Log..6-110
- w, finger and who
- updated by login program
utmp "w" output..6-112
Lastlog..6-113
SULOG..6-114
- /var/adm/sulog
HTTP Logs..6-116,6-117 *
Messages (SYSLOG)..6-118
Messages..6-119 *
The syslogd..6-120
- /etc/syslog.conf
syslog.conf..6-122
- Facilities..6-123
- Levels..6-124
- Actions..6-125
Secure Log..6-126
Example of a Secure Log after a Scan..6-127
FTP Logs..6-128
Maillog..6-132
Module 34: Securing Linux/Unix..6-136
Patch Management
Why Patch..6-138
Be Careful..6-139
Finding Out About Patches..6-140
Using apt..6-141
RPM..6-143
- rpm -q <pkgname>
- rpm -initdb
- rpm -rebuilddb
GUI Tools..6-145
Other O/S..6-146
Module 35: Securing Linux/Unix..6-148
Security Enhancement Utilities
Tripwire..6-150
Tripwire Attribute Tracking..6-151
Tripwire Common Commands..6-152
iptables..6-153
Mangle..6-154
filtering..6-155
nat..6-156
Custom Chains..6-157
rules..6-158,6-159 *
iptables -L (list)..6-160
iptables -L -n
iptables -F (flush)..6-161
Additional Security Options..6-162
- Boot Loader Password
- ps
- Netstat
- SELinux
- AppArmor
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)..6-164
Parts of SELinux..6-165
How to Enforce..6-166
DAC & SELinux Policy..6-167
MLS/MCS..6-168
SELinux COmmands..6-169
sestatus..6-170
chcon & semanage..6-171
restorecon..6-172
audit2allow..6-173
getenforce..6-174
setenforce..6-175
Other Approaches..6-176
- AppArmor
Glossary of Terms..6-181
Other
- center for internet security cis tool http://www.cisecurity.org/
- katana http://www.hackfromacave.com
aoe/sans401.txt · Last modified: 1970/01/18 07:09 by 127.0.0.1